Wang Xing's Nightmare: How Myawaddy Became a Hub of Fraud and Human Trafficking
- Human Rights Research Center
- 5 hours ago
- 12 min read
Author: Shuning Chen, MA
April 4th, 2025
Introduction
The Thailand-Myanmar border has become a "lawless zone" for telecom fraud, where warlords exploit governance vacuums, Thailand serves as a transit hub, and Chinese networks facilitate illicit operations. This convergence of factors has created an infrastructure that enables telecom fraud and human trafficking to flourish. Those marginalized by global capitalism are drawn or coerced into this underworld.
The Wang Xing incident exposes the alarming entanglement of telecom fraud and human trafficking in this region. A Chinese actor deceived by a fraudulent job offer, Wang Xing’s ordeal highlights the systematic mechanisms that sustain these illicit industries. By examining the structural and geopolitical factors at play, we can better understand why this area has become a hotspot for transnational crime.
Timeline of Wang Xing’s Incident
Wang Xing, a Chinese actor, was lured into a human trafficking scheme under the guise of a film opportunity. In December 2024, he responded to a casting call for a project in Bangkok, Thailand, unaware that the job offer was orchestrated by a criminal syndicate based in Myawaddy, Myanmar. The traffickers used WeChat (a Chinese messaging app) to recruit unsuspecting individuals, offering paid travel and accommodations, only to force them into telecom fraud compounds upon arrival. These compounds often had restricted movement, surveillance, and harsh penalties for non-compliance, effectively trapping the victims in exploitative conditions.
December 29, 2024: Initial ContactWang Xing encountered a casting call in a WeChat group for a film project in Bangkok. The recruiter, "Yan Shiliu," posed as an assistant director.
January 2, 2025: Departure from ChinaAt 9:00 PM, Wang departed from Shanghai Pudong International Airport, believing he was traveling for a legitimate film project.
January 3, 2025: Arrival and Abduction
3:00 AM: Wang arrived at Bangkok’s Suvarnabhumi Airport, where he was picked up by a Gray Toyota Altis sedan.
7:00 AM: Surveillance cameras captured the vehicle heading toward the Thai-Myanmar border.
11:00 AM: Wang was transferred to a gray Toyota Hilux Revo pickup truck, driven by a Thai citizen named Rawi, who later told authorities he was acting under the instructions of a Myanmar Karen soldier. Wang lost contact with his girlfriend, Jia Jia. His last known location was near the Thai-Myanmar border.
January 5, 2025: Missing Person Report FiledConcerned about Wang’s safety, Jia made a public post on Chinese social media, which quickly gained widespread attention. The post was shared by numerous celebrities and official organizations, amplifying the call for action and raising public awareness about his disappearance. The Thai Immigration Bureau confirmed his entry into Thailand, and the Chinese Consulate in Chiang Mai launched an investigation.
January 6-7, 2025: Investigation and DiscoveryThai authorities questioned the driver of the gray Toyota Hilux Revo pickup truck that transported Wang. The driver, a Thai citizen named Rawi, told police that he had been instructed by a Myanmar Karen soldier to pick Wang up from a supermarket in Mae Sot. Reports surfaced that Wang was spotted near the Thai-Myanmar border. Myanmar border guards later transferred him to Thai police custody, where he confirmed in a video call to his brother that he had been deceived and forced into telecom fraud work. He had also been forced to shave his head.
January 8-10, 2025: Rescue and RepatriationThai authorities intervened, rescuing Wang and arranging his return to China under diplomatic escort.
January 25 – February 17, 2025: Crackdown and Arrests
January 25: Chinese authorities arrested Yan Shiliu (the WeChat recruiter) and extradited him for prosecution.
February 5: Thailand cut electricity, internet, and fuel to scam hubs in Myawaddy.
February 12-17: Myanmar repatriated 261 trafficked victims — with significant numbers from Ethiopia, Kenya, the Philippines, Malaysia, Pakistan and China. Additionally, authorities detained 273 foreign nationals from scam compounds along the Thai-Myanmar border.
February 14: Thai police announced that 10 Chinese nationals involved in Wang Xing’s trafficking case were sent to Suvarnabhumi Airport for deportation to China.
February 17: Myanmar authorities detained 1,303 foreign nationals involved in illegal telecom fraud and gambling.
Telecom Fraud and Human Trafficking at the Thailand-Myanmar Border
Telecom fraud, particularly "pig-butchering" scams, has evolved into a global industry, defrauding victims of over $29 billion annually (Dialzara, 2024). These operations have increased demand for trafficked labor, forcing thousands into scam compounds under coercion. A UN report estimated that 250,000 people were engaged in telecom fraud operations in Cambodia and Myanmar, with the total workforce potentially reaching 1.5 million worldwide (OHCHR, 2023).
Interpol has recognized the link between telecom fraud and human trafficking as a major global crisis. An Interpol study highlighted that tens of thousands of people are trafficked across Southeast Asia, with this trend first emerging in Cambodia before spreading to Laos, Myanmar, and other Asian countries (INTERPOL, 2023). The UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s 2024 report confirmed that Thailand has become one of the largest trafficking hubs in Asia, as criminal syndicates exploit economic instability and weak border enforcement to expand their operations (UNODC, 2024). Criminal groups have leveraged post-pandemic economic shifts, where more transactions occur online, leading to an increase in telecom fraud, while job losses have made individuals more vulnerable to fraudulent job offers.
Myawaddy, a town on the Thai-Myanmar border, has become a major hub for telecom fraud and human trafficking. Located across the Moei River from Mae Sot, it serves as a scam-related trafficking destination for thousands of individuals deceived by scam recruiters.
Criminal networks in this region often use deceptive job advertisements to attract victims. Individuals seeking well-paying opportunities abroad are recruited through online listings and social media, only to find themselves trapped in scam compounds. Upon arrival, their passports are confiscated and they are subjected to threats, violence, and forced participation in fraud schemes targeting global victims.A notable example is the case of Wu Yonghui, who was lured from China to Thailand by a fake job offer and subsequently forced into a scam center near Myanmar's border, where he endured severe abuse before being rescued.
Victims of these trafficking rings are often bought and sold within an underground economy. Research from Chinese law enforcement suggests that trafficked individuals are sold for between $4,000 and $22,000, with many ending up in telecom fraud compounds or illegal gambling operations (Du & Zhang, 2022). Former drug trafficking organizations have increasingly shifted to telecom fraud due to its high profitability and lower legal risks.
Some cases show clear patterns of kidnapping. A father from Jiangxi, China, shared with China News Weekly how his son was lured into a telecom scam operation in Myanmar, and then held for ransom when he failed to meet financial targets. Families are often forced to pay large sums to secure their relatives’ release, further fueling the cycle of exploitation (iNewsweek, 2023).
As telecom fraud networks become more organized, they are not only exploiting victims financially but also forcing them into recruitment roles, coercing them to lure in new workers under similar false promises. Many victims, once trafficked, are pressured into increased participation, turning them from victims into perpetrators within the same criminal enterprise.
The growing intersection of telecom fraud and human trafficking along the Thailand-Myanmar border underscores the urgent need for stronger international collaboration and enforcement measures. Without coordinated efforts, these criminal networks will continue to exploit vulnerable individuals, constantly adapting their methods to evade law enforcement while expanding their operations across the region.
How Myawaddy Became a Hub for Online Fraud Parks
The transformation of Myawaddy into a hub for telecom fraud is not an isolated incident but rather the result of longstanding structural factors, including weak governance, warlord rule, and a transnational criminal economy. This type of economy commonly includes human trafficking, smuggling, and financial fraud which thrives beyond the reach of national governments.
Warlord Governance and the Consolidation of Myawaddy’s Fraud Economy
Myawaddy, spanning 3,140 square kilometers with a population of approximately 200,000, was originally intended to be one of Myanmar’s primary trade hubs. However, it has instead become Myanmar’s largest telecom fraud stronghold. For more than 70 years, Myanmar’s central government has failed to assert control over its ethnic minority regions. Myawaddy exemplifies this failure, operating as a de facto autonomous zone under the control of the Border Guard Force (BGF), led by Saw Chit Thu. His power is reinforced by this loyal and well-armed militia, which has remained under his family’s control since its origins in the Karen Buddhist Army. Unlike other warlords commanding small factions, Saw Chit Thu controls a paramilitary force of 6,000 troops, making him one of the most influential non-state actors in Myanmar.
By 2021, the telecom fraud industry in Myawaddy had grown so extensive that even the Myanmar government, which had long tolerated illicit activities in border regions, was forced to respond. Saw Chit Thu was officially held responsible for the crisis and ordered to resign. However, instead of complying, he resigned on his terms alongside his senior officers and the entire BGF, while refusing to surrender any weapons. This amounted to a non-violent military coup, signaling that his authority over Myawaddy was absolute. The government, wary of escalating tensions into a broader conflict, ultimately backed down. Not only did Saw Chit Thu retain his power, but later that year, he was awarded the Thiri Pyanchi honor, one of Myanmar’s highest civilian titles, further legitimizing his position (Nation Thailand, 2023). This episode demonstrated that even Myanmar’s central authorities were unwilling or unable to challenge his control over the region.
The escalation of Myanmar’s civil war in 2023 further cemented Saw Chit Thu’s position. As the Karen National Union (KNU), an armed group advocating for Karen self-determination and a federal democratic Myanmar, which he had previously opposed, gained strength, he repositioned himself as a neutral actor in the conflict. However, when the KNU launched a large-scale assault on Myawaddy in April 2024, Saw Chit Thu leveraged the crisis to extract concessions from the central government.
While outwardly engaging in peace talks with the KNU, he simultaneously negotiated with Myanmar’s military leadership, offering military support in exchange for full autonomy. The government accepted, allowing Myawaddy to remain under nominal state control while granting Saw Chit Thu near-total independence (OpenSanctions, 2024).
Following the agreement, Saw Chit Thu’s forces helped repel the KNU offensive, ensuring his continued dominance. While neither the KNU nor the Myanmar military achieved a decisive victory, the government effectively relinquished control over Myawaddy, maintaining only a symbolic presence. As the civil war rages on, Myawaddy remains a state within a state, governed by a warlord whose authority surpasses that of the central government in the region.
The Economic Evolution of Myawaddy: From Trade Hub to Scam Capital
Myawaddy’s transformation into a telecom fraud hub is distinct from other regions in Myanmar, such as the Kokang area, which evolved into a scam economy through gambling. Instead, Myawaddy’s rise as a center for illicit activities is closely tied to its geographic and economic position as the endpoint of Myanmar’s "Myawaddy Economic Corridor." Initiated in 2016, this corridor was envisioned as a trade route connecting Myanmar’s interior to deep-sea ports in Dawei, Kyaukpyu, and Thilawa, aiming to enhance the country’s logistics infrastructure. However, rather than fostering legitimate commerce, the corridor became a conduit for human trafficking and cybercrime.
By 2017, Cambodian-Chinese businessman She Zhijiang, already a key figure in Southeast Asia’s online gambling networks, entered Myawaddy under the pretense of business development. Securing official investment permits, he partnered with Saw Chit Thu to establish KK Park, the first large-scale scam compound in the region. This marked the beginning of Myawaddy’s systematic shift towards an economy dominated by telecom fraud, human trafficking, and digital financial crimes.
She Zhijiang and Saw Chit Thu reached an agreement to jointly build a new city, 2016.
Photo: COURTSEY YATAI
To fully grasp the industrialization of telecom fraud in Myawaddy, one must look north to Shwe Kokko, where the rise of Yatai New City exemplifies the expansion of the scam industry. Marketed as a smart city project, Yatai City promised foreign investment, digital finance, and high-tech infrastructure. In reality, it became a large-scale scam metropolis, where fraud syndicates operated openly under militia protection. Companies leasing office space in Yatai City paid “taxes” directly to local warlords, who ensured that Myanmar’s central authorities would not intervene. By 2023, Yatai City had evolved into a self-sufficient rogue economy, autonomous from any state.
Starlink, Telegram, and Crypto: A New Digital Frontier for Organized Crime
The survival of Myawaddy, Yatai City, and similar fraud hubs is not just due to their physical security but also their digital and financial autonomy. These crime networks have built a financial infrastructure that does not depend on traditional banking or regulatory systems. Cryptocurrency, particularly Bitcoin and Tether, is used for all transactions, making financial flows virtually untraceable (SCMP, 2023). Fraud syndicates communicate through encrypted platforms such as Telegram, ensuring operational secrecy. Moreover, when Thai authorities cut off power and internet access to Myawaddy in 2025, scam operations continued uninterrupted, relying on Starlink satellite networks that had already been integrated into the infrastructure (Prachatai, 2025).
These crime hubs now exist outside traditional state control. They are not part of Myanmar, not under Thai jurisdiction, nor bound by conventional legal frameworks. Instead, they represent an emerging model of transnational organized crime, where traditional political borders and law enforcement mechanisms are rendered ineffective. Whether in Myawaddy, Yatai City, or the more clandestine “black zones,” these economic enclaves operate through crypto-financed transactions, encrypted digital communications, and private security forces, effectively detaching themselves from conventional governance.
In this governance vacuum, these fraud enclaves have become a new form of extralegal economic zone, where power no longer resides with governments but with those who control financial and military resources. This represents a new form of digital anarchy, an unintended vision of a stateless order, where sovereignty is dictated not by law, but by economic and technological dominance.
Glossary of Terms
Telecom Fraud: Deceptive practices conducted through telecommunications, such as phone calls or internet platforms, to unlawfully obtain money or information.
Criminal Syndicate: A structured and organized group engaged in illegal activities for financial gain. These groups often operate through hierarchical or networked structures and may engage in activities such as smuggling, fraud, extortion, and illicit trade. Criminal syndicates can vary in size and scope, ranging from local organizations to transnational networks.
Diplomatic Escort: The official accompaniment of a diplomatic individual or delegation by designated personnel, such as security forces or government officials, to ensure their safety, facilitate their movement, or uphold diplomatic protocols.
Investment Scam: A fraudulent scheme where perpetrators deceive individuals into investing money, often promising high returns with little risk.
Human Trafficking: The illegal trade of humans for exploitation, including forced labor or commercial sexual activities.
Pig Butchering Scam: A type of financial fraud in which scammers build long-term trust with victims, often through social media or dating platforms, before convincing them to invest in fraudulent schemes, typically involving cryptocurrencies. The term refers to the process of "fattening up" the victim with small gains before ultimately stealing large sums.
Myawaddy: A town on the Thailand-Myanmar border known for cross-border trade and, in recent times, for reports of illicit activities.
KK Park: A complex in Myawaddy associated with various business operations, some of which have been reported to involve fraudulent activities.
Yatai New City: A development project in Shwe Kokko, Myanmar, intended as a smart city, which has attracted attention due to alleged illicit operations.
Border Guard Force (BGF): A paramilitary group in Myanmar operating along border areas, involved in regional security and local governance.
Saw Chit Thu: A leader within the Border Guard Force, influential in the Myawaddy region's administrative and security matters.
Myanmar’s Civil War: An ongoing internal conflict involving the Myanmar military (Tatmadaw), ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), pro-democracy resistance groups, and other non-state actors. The conflict escalated significantly after the military coup in February 2021, leading to widespread armed resistance and humanitarian crises. Fighting has been concentrated in various regions, including ethnic minority states and urban centers, with significant impacts on civilian populations, governance, and regional stability.
Wang Xing: A Chinese actor who reportedly became a victim of deceptive recruitment, leading to his involvement in unauthorized activities in Myanmar.
WeChat: A widely used Chinese messaging and social media application facilitating communication and networking.
Mae Sot: A Thai town adjacent to Myawaddy, serving as a significant point for cross-border movement and commerce.
Starlink: A satellite internet constellation developed by SpaceX, providing global internet coverage, including to remote regions.
Cryptocurrency (e.g., Bitcoin, Tether): Digital or virtual currencies utilizing cryptography for security, operating independently of a central authority.
Telegram: An encrypted messaging service known for its focus on privacy and security, used globally for personal and group communications.
Interpol: The International Criminal Police Organization facilitating international police cooperation against transnational crime.
UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime): A United Nations agency addressing issues related to drugs, crime, and terrorism, promoting justice and the rule of law.
Repatriation: The process of returning individuals to their country of origin or citizenship.
Autonomous Zone: A region that governs itself independently, often with limited or no intervention by national authorities.
Economic Corridor: A designated area intended to facilitate economic development and trade, often through infrastructure projects and investment.
Anarchy: A political and social condition characterized by the absence of a central governing authority or formal rule of law. In an anarchic state, power is often decentralized, leading to self-governance, localized control, or, in some cases, disorder and instability. Anarchy can result from political collapse, war, or deliberate rejection of state control.
References
Dialzara. (2024). Telecom Fraud Analytics: Key Trends in 2024. Retrieved from https://dialzara.com/blog/telecom-fraud-analytics-key-trends-2024/
Du, G., & Zhang, T. (2022). Research on Telecom Fraud and Human Trafficking in Northern Myanmar. Journal of Guangxi Police College, 35(3), 44-51. Retrieved from https://qikan.cqvip.com/Qikan/Article/Detail?id=7108263571
iNewsweek. (2023). In-depth investigation into telecom fraud and human trafficking along the Myanmar border. Retrieved from http://www.inewsweek.cn/politics/2023-07-03/19044.shtml
INTERPOL. (2023). INTERPOL issues global warning on human trafficking-fueled fraud. Retrieved from https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2023/INTERPOL-issues-global-warning-on-human-trafficking-fueled-fraud
Nation Thailand. (2023). Thailand cracks down on human trafficking gangs smuggling workers to Myanmar scam centres. Retrieved from https://www.nationthailand.com/news/asean/40046208
OHCHR. (2023). Hundreds of thousands trafficked to work as online scammers in SE Asia, says UN report. Retrieved from https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/08/hundreds-thousands-trafficked-work-online-scammers-se-asia-says-un-report
OpenSanctions. (2024). KK Park. Retrieved from https://www.opensanctions.org/entities/NK-GRoyMRLxDv4Nv2jF6rebNG/
Prachatai. (2025). Rescued scam workers detail trafficking horrors in Myanmar’s scam centers. Retrieved from https://prachataienglish.com/node/11302
Reuters. (2025). Myanmar detains 270 foreigners from scam compounds on Thai border. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/myanmar-detains-270-foreigners-scam-compounds-thai-border-2025-02-18/
Reuters. (2025). Thailand receives 260 victims of human trafficking from Myanmar. Retrieved from https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/thailand-receives-260-victims-human-trafficking-myanmar-army-says-2025-02-13/
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UNODC. (2024). Transnational Organized Crime in Southeast Asia: Evolution, Growth and Convergence. Retrieved from https://www.unodc.org/roseap/uploads/documents/Publications/2024/TOC_Convergence_Report_2024.pdf