Author: Ashley Albritton, MLA
October 29, 2024
The first article of this series explored Hannah Arendt’s Banality of Evil theory and her claim that ordinary people participate in mass atrocities due to thoughtlessness. Although Arendt describes a particular type of thoughtlessness in which the individual is incapable of thinking through another’s perspective, it was argued that this process entails an intentional subordination of the will to an external authority or moral code. To do this, the perpetrator must actively self-deceive in order to protect a virtuous or respectable self-concept.
Adolf Eichmann, along with his fellow Nazis, went through great mental hurdles to maintain their virtuous self-concept. What does this mean? What is an individual’s self-concept, and why is it so important? Let us now explore the psychological phenomenon of the self-concept and how it determines whether someone will participate in violence on a mass scale. We will see that people who participate in mass violence have the weakest sense of self and, thus, must go to the greatest lengths to protect themselves against their conscience by convincing their inner selves of their innocence.
In “Cracking the Code of Genocide: The Moral Psychology of Rescuers, Bystanders, and Nazis during the Holocaust” (2008), Monroe explored the causes of why ordinary people become genocidal. They interviewed several people who were identified as rescuers, bystanders, or perpetrators based on the interviewee’s actions during World War II and also asked what differentiated rescuers from the other two types of people.[1] The author qualitatively analyzed the interviewees’ psychological factors such as self-concept, worldview, cognitive classifications, sense of agency, and history of trauma. Monroe found that self-concept was the central factor and influenced the other psychological factors.[2] It influenced whether the individual would be inclusive or exclusive in their categorization of others as human and worthy of compassion, whether they felt like a victim of circumstance or under threat, and whether they felt a sense of agency to make a difference.[3] Furthermore, the author explains that the rescuers felt “an internal locus of control over fate … versus an external locus” with the perpetrators and bystanders.[4] Specifically, the rescuers had a strong sense of self as people who were connected to others through bonds of common humanity, while the bystanders believed themselves to be weak with low efficacy and little control over their situation.[5]
Interestingly, the perpetrators had a sense of victimhood as they believed that they were besieged by threats to their own and their community’s well-being and, importantly, that they had to strike preemptively to protect their ontological security.[6] Svilcic and Maldini (2014) explain that, for perpetrators of persecution, this fear becomes institutionalized and then leveraged by political narrative to justify the persecution of the perceived enemy.[7] This ultimately allows the individual to reclaim their sense of identity and agency as “an essential cohesive actor … [in] society.”[8] While all of Monroe’s interviewees demonstrated an adherence to personal value systems, only rescuers included the sanctity of human life in general as part of this value system.[9]
Although Eichmann’s position in the Nazi organization gave him some authority, Arendt notes that he lacked a strong sense of self as well as a sense of autonomy over his thoughts and purpose in life.[10] His self-concept could be considered that of a bystander who always followed the lead of others but who gained a false sense of strength, importance, and efficacy through his role as a follower of “something historic, grand, unique.”[11] He therefore intentionally aligned himself, his purpose, and his actions with that of the most predominant external locus – the Nazi party – thus, transforming himself into a perpetrator.
This analysis is reinforced by Lerner and Tetlock’s (1999) review of psychological research on accountability and social judgements. They define accountability as “implicit or explicit expectations that one may be called on to justify one’s beliefs, feelings, and actions to others” and may receive positive or negative consequences if a satisfactory justification is not provided.[12] Most importantly, the authors found that “Self-critical and effortful thinking is most likely to be activated when decision makers learn prior to forming any opinions that they will be accountable to an audience” that they perceive as credible.[13]
For Eichmann, accountability to the Third Reich was all that mattered, and so his self-critical thinking was not activated but assimilated. This sense of accountability to the authority of the Third Reich ran so deep with Eichmann that, during his trial, he discussed a time when he had given assistance to a half-Jewish cousin and Jewish couple for which he later “‘confessed his sins’ to his superiors.”[14] He was keenly aware of this sense of accountability only to his superiors. He stated during the trial, “Nobody … came to me and reproached me for anything in the performance of my duties. Not even Pastor Gruber claims to have done so.”[15] This mention of confession to a pastor is striking because it shows that Eichmann was conscious of some authority beyond the Third Reich that he may be held accountable to but that this other authority was ultimately aligned with – or at least not in direct conflict with – the Nazi cause.
Another important finding by Lerner and Tetlock was that cognitive dissonance theory and impression management theory predict that individuals will rationalize past actions through self-justification rather than self-criticism if they were “irrevocably committed” to a decision.[16] This can be seen throughout Eichmann’s statements during the trial. For instance, Eichmann vehemently denied his charges of murder because he never did the direct physical act of killing but, rather, rationalized his years of participation in the systematic murder of millions as merely “‘aiding and abetting’ the annihilation of the Jews.”[17] This mindset was reinforced by the belief that any opposition to the unfolding events was “impossible” and “unthinkable.”[18] Thus, the perpetrator takes a step closer to embracing the self-concept as a victim of circumstance.
Eichmann’s propensity to rationalize his involvement in the Holocaust was shared by many other Nazi supporters. It echoes the testimony of other Nazi officers at the Nuremberg Trials who declared that opposition was “utterly pointless.”[19] This phenomenon also reflected a psychological tendency towards passive risk-taking in decision-making. This psychological tendency, discussed by Keinan and Bereby-Meyer (2017), causes a reduced sense of agency and accountability for an individual’s actions.[20] Passive risk-taking, which the authors define as “forgoing an opportunity to act to reduce outcome variance,” is perceived as less risky than active choices despite the two resulting in the same consequences.[21] The researchers examined this through survey experiments of hypothetical scenarios in which volunteers were asked to assess the associated risk and responsibility if they found themselves in those situations. The researchers reinforced their argument by using existing theories of omission bias, fear of regret, and status quo bias. They assert that the low perception of personal responsibility for the consequences of passive choices extends to damages and harm done to others and, therefore, calls into question assumptions about immoral behaviors.[22] In the case of Holocaust perpetrators, this took the form of the feeling that opposition was pointless or that one’s participation prevented someone worse or more brutal from taking over their duty, thereby deciding to maintain the status quo while never having to act or take responsibility.[23]
Indeed, Eichmann and other perpetrators went to great lengths to believe in their own victimhood to soothe their conscience. Another way this was accomplished was through the careful use of language. Arendt discussed the use of what she called “language rules”, in which certain morally charged words were replaced to essentially change the perceived meaning of the actions they describe.[24] For instance, the word “murder” was replaced by phrases like “final solution,” “special treatment,” “medical matters,” and “to grant a mercy death.”[25] More importantly, she explains that these language rules helped the individuals to overcome their instinctual sense of empathy for another’s suffering and redirect the victimhood to the self.[26] Thus, instead of saying “What horrible things I did to people!”, the perpetrator would say, “What horrible things I had to watch in the pursuance of my duties, how heavily the task weighed upon my shoulders!”[27] This linguistic strategy has significant implications for perpetrators of atrocities in various contexts because it shifts the locus of control from an internal to an external locus and creates the perceived circumstances in which the actor must participate. As Monroe (2008) explained above, this internal versus external locus is a significant factor in whether an individual will act as a rescuer, bystander, or perpetrator. In the context of Nazi Germany, the shifting language rules effectively created the psychological conditions for a whole society to become perpetrators and bystanders.
Yet, it must be emphasized that all these social-psychological factors contribute to the individual’s internal dialogue, which is essential to forming their self-concept. The two-in-one internal dialogue – between me and myself in which I examine what I say and do – acts as a conscience builder or destroyer. If someone tells themselves that the murder they just committed was actually a burden they must bear, then they will reinforce the self-concept of victimhood. This is the figurative martyr’s death mentioned in Part One. Likewise, if someone tells themselves that, by continuing to play their role in persecution, they are preventing someone more brutal from causing the victims additional suffering, then they will consistently rationalize those actions to avoid true accountability. This is an example of passive risk-taking. The perpetrators will hold tight to these internal delusions because their entire sense of self depends on it. As Arendt explains about internal dialogue, “What makes a man fear [his] conscience is the anticipation of the presence of a witness who awaits him only if and when he goes home” [emphasis in original].[28] This “if” is truly significant and is what the psychological mechanisms discussed render so evasive.
Glossary
Cognitive dissonance theory: A mental disturbance people feel when they realize their cognitions and actions are inconsistent or contradictory.
Fear of regret theory: When the anticipation of regret influences making decisions including to take action or not.
Genocide: The deliberate killing of a large number of people from a particular nation or ethnic group with the aim of destroying that nation or group.
Impression management theory: The process of influencing how others perceive the individual by regulating the information one shares in social interactions.
Internal dialogue: The inner voice that people have in their heads which plays a significant role in how people think, feel, and behave.
Omission bias theory: The tendency to judge harmful actions as worse than harmful inactions, even when the results are similar.
Rationalization: A defense mechanism in which people justify difficult or unacceptable feelings with seemingly logical reasons and explanations.
Status quo bias: When the feeling of discomfort of a new or uncertain situation causes the individual to prefer the existing state of affairs.
References
Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. London: Penguin Group, 2006.
Arendt, Hannah. Responsibility and Judgement. Edited by Jerome Kohn. New York: Schocken Books, 2003.
Keinan, Ruty, and Bereby-Meyer, Yoella. “Perceptions of Active Versus Passive Risks, and the Effect of Personal Responsibility.” Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin 43, no. 7 (2017): 999–1007. Accessed October 4, 2023. https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/doi/pdf/10.1177/0146167217703079.
Lerner, Jennifer and Tetlock, Philip. “Accounting for The Effects of Accountability.” Psychological Bulletin 125 (1999): 255-75. Accessed October 19, 2023. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/13203036_Accounting_for_The_Effects_of_Accountability.
Monroe, Kristen Renwick. “Cracking the Code of Genocide: The Moral Psychology of Rescuers, Bystanders, and Nazis during the Holocaust.” Political Psychology 29, no. 5 (2008): 699–736. Accessed November 13, 2023. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20447159.
Svilcic, Niksa and Maldini, Pero. “Political Myths and Totalitarianism: An Anthropological Analysis of Their Causal Interrelationship.” Collegium Antropologicum 38, no. 2 (2014): 725-738. Accessed August 7, 2024. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264988848_Political_myths_and_totalitarianism_An_anthropological_analysis_of_their_causal_interrelationship.
Footnotes
[1] Monroe, Kristen Renwick. “Cracking the Code of Genocide: The Moral Psychology of Rescuers, Bystanders, and Nazis during the Holocaust.” Political Psychology 29, no. 5 (2008): 700. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20447159.
[2] Ibid., 700.
[3] Ibid., 700.
[4] Ibid., 716.
[5] Ibid., 711-712.
[6] Ibid., 712.
[7] Svilcic, Niksa and Maldini, Pero. “Political Myths and Totalitarianism: An Anthropological Analysis of Their Causal Interrelationship.” Collegium Antropologicum 38, no. 2 (2014): 729. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/264988848_Political_myths_and_totalitarianism_An_anthropological_analysis_of_their_causal_interrelationship.
[8] Svilcic and Maldini, 730, 736.
[9] Monroe, 723.
[10] Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. (London: Penguin Group, 2006), 32-35.
[11] Ibid., 32, 105.
[12] Lerner, Jennifer and Tetlock, Philip. “Accounting for The Effects of Accountability.” Psychological Bulletin 125 (1999): 255. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/13203036_Accounting_for_The_Effects_of_Accountability.
[13] Ibid., 259.
[14] Arendt, Eichmann, 137.
[15] Ibid., 131.
[16] Lerner and Tetlock, “Accounting…”, 257.
[17] Arendt, Eichmann, 22.
[18] Ibid., 92.
[19] Ibid., 127.
[20] Keinan, Ruty, and Bereby-Meyer, Yoella. “Perceptions of Active Versus Passive Risks, and the Effect of Personal Responsibility.” Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin 43, no. 7 (2017): 999. https://journals-sagepub-com.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/doi/pdf/10.1177/0146167217703079.
[21] Ibid., 999.
[22] Ibid., 1004, 1005.
[23] Arendt, Eichmann, 127-128.
[24] Ibid., 86, 108.
[25] Ibid., 69, 85, 108.
[26] Ibid., 106.
[27] Ibid., 106.
[28] Arendt, Hannah. Responsibility and Judgement. Edited by Jerome Kohn. (New York: Schocken Books, 2003), 187.