Author: Ashley Albritton, MLA
December 11, 2024
The first and second articles in this series discussed Hannah Arendt’s theory of thoughtlessness and the importance of self-concept in determining participation in genocide. This article, Part Three of the series, will explore some of the psychology and neuroscience of this important aspect of the human condition to illustrate how these mechanisms can be leveraged to prevent future mass atrocities.
From the previous articles, we saw how Adolf Eichmann and his Nazi comrades went to great psychological lengths to protect their conscience from the reality of their actions. But was this process completely conscious?
Some scholars have suggested that this process also occurred at a subconscious level. Let us now examine those claims and how they relate to Arendt’s assertion that moral codes are adopted automatically like customs and habits and acted out like table manners. In studying these claims, we can develop a clearer idea of how we can counter this supposedly unconscious process and guard ourselves against unthinking participation in mass atrocities.
Recently, two scholars, De Pieri and Lawtoo, have made arguments that seem to support Arendt’s assertion about thoughtlessness or, at least, her argument that Eichmann’s actions and motivations were not completely intentional, and his responses were possibly automatic. De Pieri (2023) dives deeper into the mind and motivations of Eichmann himself by looking through the combined lenses of psycho- and socio-pathology to decide “what degree an individual’s exposure to a politically and socially toxic environment may affect the banality attributed to their [sic] actions, including criminal ones.”[1]
De Pieri compares Arendt’s analysis with the reports of other psychologists who had analyzed the trial notes or, in one instance, Eichmann himself. For example, Dr. Shlomo Kulcsar clinically interviewed Eichmann over seven three-hour sessions before the trial. De Pieri’s analysis finds that Eichmann seemed to be role-playing or wearing a mask or had a borderline personality disorder, such as schizophrenia.[2]
Another possible diagnosis was “a severe case of mythomania, coupled with a deficit in the so-called ‘theory of mind’ […] whereby Eichmann was incapable of attributing and understanding his own and others’ mental states and predicting their consequences.”[3] This may have been a sort of psychological survival mechanism for dealing with the trauma of the circumstances and/or overcoming any crises of consciousness.[4] In doing so, however, he would have unintentionally forfeited his own identity and will in acts of disassociation and splitting –both could explain his detachment from the real horrors of the war.[5] This possibility of unintentionality complicates our ability to determine the morality of Eichmann’s actions.
There was no official diagnosis of any psychological disorder. However, De Pieri asserts a mix of ataraxia, abulia, and adiaphora as another possible explanation for his state of mind – indifference to the world’s good or evil – which could explain his lack of will to make individual moral decisions.[6] It is still unclear, however, whether his indifference would have been intentional.
The idea that Eichmann was automatically role-playing is reinforced by Lawtoo (2021), who argues that Eichmann’s entire personality had become an imitation of other people’s personalities. Lawtoo compare Arendt’s analysis of Eichmann during the trial with philosopher Bettina Stangneth’s analysis of Eichmann’s post-war writings during his exile in Argentina prior to his capture and transport to Jerusalem. Building on the Greek concept of mimesis – i.e., mimos, meaning mimicry, mirroring, or performance – Lawtoo suggests that Eichmann’s behavior reflects an “interplay between conscious impersonation and unconscious identification, mirroring speech (logos) and contagious affect (pathos).”[7] More specifically, this is a psychoanalytical condition wherein an external idea or suggestion is internalized so thoroughly that it alters the state of mind and is manifested into an automatic action similar to hypnosis or sleepwalking.[8]
However, Haslam and Reicher (2007) make a different argument in their comparison of Eichmann to individuals in other famous social psychology studies, such as Milgram’s 1963 Electric Shock Experiment and Zimbardo’s 1973 Stanford Prison Experiment, on participants’ willingness to engage in violence when pressured to obey authority or given full authority, respectively. They point out that Eichmann’s actions cannot have been considered automatic because he regularly acted creatively and with conviction – a characteristic they attribute to all perpetrators of atrocity.[9]
Moreover, the automatic mimicry of crowd behavior can be argued to be fundamentally based on morality. Eichmann automatically adopted the perceived moral standards of his comrades and then adjusted his actions accordingly. For this to happen, he had to have believed – consciously or unconsciously – that those moral standards were acceptable. This logic reinforces Arendt’s claim that obedience is actually an act of recognition and support.
However, Lawtoo further argues that mimicry is a rational process commonly associated with “identification, influence, crowd behavior, and involuntary mirroring reflexes”, which is based on neuroscience and is, thus, a pervasive and contagious phenomenon of the human condition.[10] Arendt also makes this argument in The Life of the Mind (1981) that “Unthinking men are like sleepwalkers.”[11]
If mimesis is so fundamentally ingrained into human psychology, as Lawtoo argues, can we be roused from it? Can its influence be resisted? If so, how? Does its pervasiveness necessarily have to be negative? Answering these questions is fundamental to understanding how we can prevent mass atrocities such as another Holocaust.
As outlined in Part One of this series, Arendt claimed that the moral codes of a society are often adopted automatically, like customs and habits that are acted out like table manners, and that following the socially acceptable moral code is the mark of respectable society.[12] Adopting moral codes in an “automatic way” causes the individual to unthinkingly prejudge each new experience against a set of general rules.[13] The problem is that these general rules are never questioned or doubted precisely because they are socially accepted. Moral codes are taken for granted on the basis that others are adhering to them as well. Yet, this uncritical and automatic adoption of moral codes causes people to
“hold fast to whatever the prescribed rules of conduct may be at a given time in a given society. What people then get used to is not so much the content of the rules…as the possession of rules under which to subsume particulars. In other words, they get used to never making up their minds” [emphasis added].[14]
Arendt further argues that the more ardently individuals follow or defend these moral codes, the more quickly and easily they will switch to a completely different set of customs simply for the sake of possessing any moral or behavioral guidelines to which they can unthinkingly adhere.[15]
Now, let us consider Eichmann’s psychological journey. He held the socially accepted moral codes around success and obedience as virtues and viewed Hitler as the ultimate success story to which he should subordinate himself (Part One). However, Eichmann did experience several crises of conscience throughout World War II, despite his adherence to the customs of the period.[16] Contradicting Arendt’s argument on thoughtlessness, these fleeting moments seem to have represented Eichmann’s innate ability to reflect critically on the situation and his actions. Yet, he actively engaged in mimesis, or mirroring, in response to these doubts, rationalizing his inner dialogue and actively suppressing his conscience.
The most striking example of this happened at the infamous 1942 Wannsee Conference when Hitler announced the Final Solution – the physical extermination of all Jewish people – to top Nazi officials. Eichmann attended the conference but was one of the lowest-ranking individuals present. During his trial in Jerusalem, Eichmann admitted that he had felt doubtful about “such a bloody solution through violence.”[17] However, he never spoke up against the final solution or the members of respectable society present. Instead, he assumed he was in the wrong for doubting and actively suppressed his thoughts on the matter. Arendt explains, “As Eichmann told it, the most potent factor in the soothing of his own conscience was the simple fact that he could see no one, no one at all, who actually was against the Final Solution”. Therefore, he thought, “Who was he to judge? Who was he ‘to have [his] own thoughts in the matter’?” [emphasis in original].[18]
The above is a clear example of many of the discussed philosophical and psychological mechanisms at work: success, obedience, hierarchy, self-concept, accountability, cognitive dissonance, rationalization, passive risk-taking, and mimesis. However, it does not display evidence of a personality disorder, indifference, or even thoughtlessness. Rather, Eichmann demonstrated intentionality in the active subordination of his will to the new socially accepted moral code.
However, Eichmann’s experience of doubting at the Wannsee Conference was not unique. One of the findings from Lerner and Tetlock’s (1999) report on how accountability affects social judgments is that accountability does not affect fundamental cognitive processes – in other words, how people think – but only their willingness to say what they are thinking in public.[19] This was clearly the case with Eichmann; and it was made worse by the other psychological mechanisms that silenced both his voice and his conscience.
This unwillingness to express one’s genuine thoughts and doubts in public was apparently common among other Nazis and ordinary German citizens during the war. Arendt calls this phenomenon “inner emigration”, i.e., having an inner opposition while performing an outer role of support.[20] These people retrospectively claim to have had to “appear ‘outwardly’ even more like Nazis than ordinary Nazis did, in order to keep their secret.”[21] If this was true, the internal dialogue of these individuals continued to function, but their fear of extreme physical or social consequences caused them to override their own conscience, ultimately choosing to subordinate their will to authority. Yet, this may also be a convenient excuse for those people now held accountable to a moral authority other than the Third Reich.
However, the possibility of an inner opposition is significant. Although it will never be clear exactly how many Nazis held onto an inner opposition or if their retrospective claim to have had such thoughts was genuine, the possibility of its existence is crucial, especially on a massive scale. If it is the case that thoughtlessness or an absence of critical reflection leads to participation in mass atrocity, according to Arendt, then the possibility to think or doubt provides a glimmer of hope for us to resist regardless of how deeply doubt is suppressed by myriad psychological mechanisms. The key is to override the destructiveness of these mechanisms and realign them with the virtues of thinking and, more specifically, doubting. As Arendt notes, it is the doubters and skeptics who are used to examining things and making up their own minds.[22]
Certainly, creating a society where thinking, doubting, and empathy – recall that Eichmann suppressed his conscience, and the Nazi language rules (Part Two) sought to override empathy for others’ suffering in general – are considered the ultimate virtues that are key to reducing the risk of participation in future atrocities. This is not to say that we can simply think our way to a new or perfect moral code that will prevent any such occurrence because this would only lead to some new set of general rules for individuals to follow automatically. Arendt explains that thinking “does not create values; it will not find out, once and for all, what ‘the good’ is; it does not confirm but, rather, dissolves accepted rules and conduct.”[23] Instead, the answer is to enculturate a society in which thinking and doubting are not just idealized virtues but widely practiced and even expected.
It is the thinking process that should be encouraged and practiced at all levels of society. Moreover, individuals should be encouraged to voice their thoughts and doubts. Thinking has a “purging component … which brings out the implications of unexamined opinions and thereby destroys them – values, doctrines, theories, and even convictions,” Arendt claims.[24] She continues to state that this destruction facilitates the ability to determine that specifically this or that situation or action is morally wrong.[25]
Let us take this argument a step further. Making the act of thinking a socially accepted – even expected – virtue is essentially merging it with the psychological mechanisms that prevented it from happening in the case of Eichmann and other Nazis. Remember that Eichmann’s fundamental motivations stemmed from the socially accepted virtues of success and obedience, which were closely tied to the moral code of the period. The psychological mechanisms that influenced his behavior ultimately aligned with these virtues, not the other way around. Therefore, if the socially accepted virtues were critical reflection and thoughtfulness, even to the point of defiance in the face of social pressure, then blind obedience to authority would become less of a threat. Moreover, it would be spread throughout society by that fundamentally pervasive aspect of human psychology – mimesis.
Lawtoo (2021) claims that the human tendency towards mirroring makes us vulnerable to the rise of fascism today.[26] However, vulnerabilities do not equal inevitabilities. Indeed, it is only the case if our socially accepted values make it so. This vulnerability can be transformed into a strength, but the onus is on each of us. We can choose what virtues we value and use our free will to act on those virtues. It requires deliberate acts of the will to think and to demonstrate that critical reflection through actions that others witness, even if these actions seem insignificant. In other words, the process of thinking must also be performed as much as possible. Importantly, it is not enough to just think, although that is a great start. Thinking individuals must also show that they are actively thinking for their thinking to be mirrored by others. Therefore, we must speak up even if that leads to social consequences. It is much easier to do this now than when we find ourselves immersed in the next mass atrocity, and the consequences are more dire.
The question we are left with is: How? How do we create a society of empathetic thinkers who have a strong self-concept and value the sanctity of all human life?
A good place to start is with education. A report by Georgetown University (2020) finds a correlation between declining liberal arts and humanities majors and the rise of authoritarian attitudes worldwide.[27] Although business and STEM education is crucial for a thriving economy, it should not come at the cost of humanistic values. By valuing humanistic and critical-thinking education, we can create a society buttressed against thoughtless violence on a mass scale and leverage this aspect of our fundamental human condition for good.
Conclusion
Even though this argument has been built upon a case study from a specific time and place – Nazi Germany – and scholarship from the Western canon and behavioral science research, the sad reality is that mass atrocities such as genocide continue to occur all over the world.[28] It is this author’s hope that understanding the mechanisms involved in these situations will not just prevent the Western world from repeating this dark history but also help those who are currently suffering elsewhere. This is, after all, an exploration of an unsettling but pervasive aspect of the human condition. Ultimately, we cannot change how our fundamental social-psychological mechanisms work. But we can choose who we want to be by choosing the virtues that guide these mechanisms. We must begin with ourselves. We must choose our virtues and actions. We must choose to be thoughtful.
Glossary
Abulia: An absence of willpower or an inability to act decisively, as a symptom of mental illness.
Adiaphora: An indifference to things or events, especially in controversial matters such as of morality or religion.
Ataraxia: A state of freedom from emotional disturbance and anxiety; emotional tranquility.
Banality: The fact or condition of being unoriginal or common.
Cognitive dissonance: A psychological state that occurs when someone has conflicting beliefs, attitudes, or actions, and experiences discomfort as a result.
Disassociation: A mental process that involves a disconnect from one’s thoughts, feelings, memories, or sense of identity.
Genocide: The deliberate killing of a large number of people from a particular nation or ethnic group with the aim of destroying that nation or group.
Hypnosis: The induction of a state of consciousness in which a person apparently loses the power of voluntary action and is highly responsive to suggestion or direction.
Mimesis: Representation or imitation of the real world in art and literature.
Moral/Ethical code: A set of rules or standards that people choose to live by in order to keep their behavior aligned with the values of their culture or upbringing.
Mythomania: An abnormal or pathological tendency to exaggerate or tell lies.
Psychopathology: The scientific study of mental illness or disorders.
Rationalization: A defense mechanism in which people justify difficult or unacceptable feelings with seemingly logical reasons and explanations.
Schizophrenia: A mental disorder that affects the way a person thinks, acts, and expresses emotions; it affects the individual’s ability to tell what is real or imagined.
Footnotes
[1] De Pieri, Veronica. “Wird Irgendetwas Mit Mir Geschehen? Psycho(patho)logical Perspectives on Hannah Arendt’s The Banality of Evil”. DIVE-IN – An International Journal on Diversity and Inclusion 3, no. 1 (2023): 11, accessed February 6, 2024, https://doi.org/10.6092/issn.2785-3233/17278.
[2] Ibid., 21-22.
[3] Ibid., 24.
[4] Ibid., 24-25.
[5] Ibid., 25.
[6] Ibid., 22.
[7] Lawtoo, Nidesh. “The Case of Eichmann Restaged: Arendt, Evil, and the Complexity of Mimesis.” Political Research Quarterly 74, no.2 (2021): 483, accessed February 6, 2024, https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912920911201.
[8] Ibid., 484.
[9] Hamilton, V. Lee, and Joseph Sanders. “The Effect of Roles and Deeds on Responsibility Judgments: The Normative Structure of Wrongdoing.” Social Psychology Quarterly 44, no. 3 (1981): 237, accessed September 28, 2023, https://doi.org/10.2307/3033836.
[10] Lawtoo, 484, 480.
[11] Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: Volume One/Thinking (Boston: Mariner Books Classics, 1981), 191.
[12] Arendt, Hannah. Responsibility and Judgement. Edited by Jerome Kohn (New York: Schocken Books, 2003), 178.
[13] Ibid., 44.
[14] Ibid., 178.
[15] Ibid., 178.
[16] Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (London: Penguin Group, 2006), 31, 83-84, 87-89, 93, 106, 114, 123-126, 137-138.
[17] Ibid., 114.
[18] Ibid., 114.
[19] Lerner, Jennifer and Tetlock, Philip. “Accounting for The Effects of Accountability.” Psychological Bulletin 125 (1999): 266, accessed October 19, 2023, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/13203036_Accounting_for_The_Effects_of_Accountability.
[20] Arendt, Responsibility, 126-127.
[21] Ibid., 126-127.
[22] Ibid., 45.
[23] Arendt, The Life, Volume One, 192.
[24] Ibid., 192.
[25] Ibid., 192.
[26] Lawtoo, “The Case…”, 488.
[27] Carnevale, et al. “The Role of Education in Taming Authoritarian Attitudes.” Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce (2020): 1-3, https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED609008.pdf.
[28] Genocide Watch. “Genocide Alerts.” n.d., Accessed May 7, 2024. https://www.genocidewatch.com/countries-at-risk; Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide. “Countries at Risk for Mass Killing 2023-2024: Early Warning Project Statistical Risk Assessment Results.” Early Warning Project, January 12, 2024. https://earlywarningproject.ushmm.org/reports/countries-at-risk-for-mass-killing-2023-24-early-warning-project-statistical-risk-assessment-results; Tisdall, Simon. “China, Myanmar and now Darfur … the horror of genocide is here again.” The Guardian, July 2, 2023. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/jul/02/china-myanmar-and-now-darfur-the-horror-of-genocide-is-here-again.
Sources
Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. London: Penguin Group, 2006.
Arendt, Hannah. Responsibility and Judgement. Edited by Jerome Kohn. New York: Schocken Books, 2003.
Arendt, Hannah. The Life of the Mind: One/Thinking, Two/Willing. Boston: Mariner Books Classics, 1981.
Carnevale, A., Smith, N., Drazanova, L., Gulish, A., Campbell, K. “The Role of Education in Taming Authoritarian Attitudes.” Georgetown University Center on Education and the Workforce (2020). https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED609008.pdf
De Pieri, Veronica. “Wird Irgendetwas Mit Mir Geschehen? Psycho(patho)logical Perspectives on Hannah Arendt’s The Banality of Evil.” DIVE-IN – An International Journal on Diversity and Inclusion 3, no. 1 (2023): 7-42. Accessed February 6, 2024. https://doi.org/10.6092/issn.2785-3233/17278.
Genocide Watch. “Genocide Alerts.” n.d., Accessed May 7, 2024. https://www.genocidewatch.com/countries-at-risk.
Hamilton, V. Lee, and Joseph Sanders. “The Effect of Roles and Deeds on Responsibility Judgments: The Normative Structure of Wrongdoing.” Social Psychology Quarterly 44, no. 3 (1981): 237–54. Accessed September 28, 2023. https://doi.org/10.2307/3033836.
Haslam, S. Alexander, and Reicher, Stephen. “Beyond the Banality of Evil: Three Dynamics of an Interactionist Social Psychology of Tyranny.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 33, no. 5 (2007): 615–622. Accessed September 21, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167206298570.
Lawtoo, Nidesh. “The Case of Eichmann Restaged: Arendt, Evil, and the Complexity of Mimesis.” Political Research Quarterly 74, no.2 (2021): 479-490. Accessed February 6, 2024. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912920911201.
Lerner, Jennifer, and Tetlock, Philip. “Accounting for The Effects of Accountability.” Psychological Bulletin 125 (1999): 255-75. Accessed October 19, 2023. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/13203036_Accounting_for_The_Effects_of_Accountability.
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide. “Countries at Risk for Mass Killing 2023-2024: Early Warning Project Statistical Risk Assessment Results.” Early Warning Project, January 12, 2024. Accessed May 7, 2024. https://earlywarningproject.ushmm.org/reports/countries-at-risk-for-mass-killing-2023-24-early-warning-project-statistical-risk-assessment-results.
Tisdall, Simon. “China, Myanmar and now Darfur … the horror of genocide is here again.” The Guardian, July 2, 2023. Accessed May 7, 2024. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/jul/02/china-myanmar-and-now-darfur-the-horror-of-genocide-is-here-again.