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Human Rights Research Center

China’s Human Rights Discourse: Reshaping the International Framework - Part One

Author: Vivian Sun

November 13, 2024



China’s emergence as a global power has been considered a strong development of international relations in the early 21st century. Ever since China became officially involved in the United Nations (UN), it has, despite a changing attitude, promoted its own “Human Rights Discourse” as part of its broader diplomatic goals, aligning with its governance model and cultural values. This two-part series will explore China's “Human Rights Discourse” and its key strategies in reshaping the international human rights framework, which include increasing its influence in UN affairs and opposing the U.S.-dominated human rights narrative.


China’s “Human Rights Discourse”


The concept of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” was first proposed in 1982 by the former Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping, at the Twelfth National Congress of the China Communist Party (CCP). Since then, it has become a key term in Chinese political discourse, frequently referenced in legislative frameworks and political documents. In the 1991 White Paper on Human Rights, the Chinese government extended this concept into the human rights regime, and articulated its approach to human rights protection, emphasizing three core principles.


  • First, the Chinese government prioritized the right to subsistence and development. This perspective was shaped by China’s historical experience in the 19th century. Since the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, the government has consistently sought to improve living standards and foster economic growth. Despite considerable progress, China acknowledges that ongoing challenges related to economic development and resource constraints continue to threaten the fundamental right to subsistence and development, necessitating persistent efforts to address these issues.


  • Second, the Chinese government prioritized socio-economic rights. Central to this is the right to economic development, which the government promotes as a collective and individual entitlement. China’s socialist framework, based on public ownership of key resources, prioritizes the equal development of all citizens. According to the idea of collective human rights, the Chinese government considers it important for the government to promote citizens’ rights, which in China’s perspective, cannot be enforced through individual powers. According to Xue Hanqin, a Chinese judge serving on the International Court of Justice, “Culturally, collective and societal interests are always viewed with deference in the Chinese society. It is a virtue that in pursuing social harmony, peace and order, collective and communal interests, if necessary, should prevail over individual interest.”


  • Third, the Chinese government underscored the integration of human rights with national sovereignty. This position supports China’s advocacy for the principle of “non-interference in internal affairs.” Criticisms of alleged human rights violations are viewed as infringements on China’s sovereign jurisdiction. In this context, the government argues that multilateral treaties, while open to lawful scrutiny, should not undermine China’s sovereignty. The government reserves the right to invoke the principle of "non-interference in internal affairs" when deemed “necessary,” thereby limiting external pressures on domestic legal and political matters.


In the 2019 White Paper on Human Rights, the Chinese government once again emphasized the aforementioned aspects and articulated a strong confidence in further advancing the protection of human rights within the country.


China’s first strategy to promote its “Human Rights Discourse” and reshape the international human rights framework by increasing its influence in UN affairs


China has long positioned the UN as the most significant center for promoting its conception of human rights and enhancing global governance. Beijing characterizes the UN as the world’s “most universal, representative, authoritative inter-governmental international organization” and the premier multilateral institution for addressing global threats and challenges. It underscores that the UN must play “the central role... in international affairs” to maintain international peace and security.


1.       China’s evolving attitude towards the international human rights regime

China’s posture towards the international human rights regime has evolved significantly over the past four decades. Initially, as China engaged with the UN system, its focus was primarily on the principle of "non-interference in internal affairs" as a means of promoting national sovereignty. This stance was articulated in the 1988 edition of the Beijing Review, which asserted that China “opposes the interference in other countries’ internal affairs under the pretext of defending human rights.” Following its accession to the UN Commission on Human Rights in 1982, China began to ratify several major international human rights treaties.

 

However, despite these ratifications, a notable shift in China’s previously passive stance only occurred in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident which placed the Chinese government’s actions at the forefront of international scrutiny within the UN. This incident compelled China to respond actively within the Commission on Human Rights and to advocate for its interpretations of national sovereignty and the principle of “non-interference in internal affairs.” Consequently, China began to assert that UN resolutions “constituted interference in China’s affairs and an attempt to exert pressure on China.”

 

Entering the 21st century, particularly after Xi Jinping came into power in 2012 and his vision for global governance commenced China’s approach to human rights diplomacy underwent a significant transformation from a defensive posture to one of active measures. A 2019 article written by two Chinese scholars suggested China’s “human rights discourse power” included “strengthened confidence in China's human rights protection,” “deep intervention in UN human rights institutions and affairs,” and “active human rights agenda-setting”.

 

2.       China and the Human Rights Council

The UN Human Rights Council (HRC) was established in 2006 to replace the UN Commission on Human Rights. The HRC is composed of 47 member states, with 26 seats allocated to Asia and Africa, and 13 to Western countries. The HRC’s primary functions include drafting condemnatory country-specific resolutions and statements, as well as conducting the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) to assess the human rights performance of member states. The HRC oversees more than 50 special procedures aimed at addressing human rights issues either specific to certain countries or thematic in nature. Although the resolutions and outcomes of the UPR are not legally binding, they exert considerable influence by exposing human rights violations, thereby affecting the international reputation of states and raising global concerns.

 

Human rights violations in China have frequently drawn significant international attention, particularly in connection with the aforementioned 1989 Tiananmen Square Incident and recent allegations of human rights abuses in Xinjiang. In 1989, the pro-democracy protesters in Tiananmen Square were violently suppressed, promoting widespread global condemnation and the imposition of economic sanctions. Since then, China has been repeatedly condemned by the UN and in various international forums. A similar situation occurred in 2022 when the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) issued a report confirming the allegation of large-scale human rights violations in Xinjiang. According to the report, hundreds of thousands of Uyghurs (a predominantly Muslim ethnic minority from Xinjiang) have been arbitrarily detained in so-called "re-education" camps under policies targeting “extremism.” This assessment by the OHCHR led to a series of economic sanctions imposed by Western nations.

 

In response to international allegations of human rights violations, China consistently adheres to the principles of “non-interference in internal affairs.” This principle was repeatedly invoked in response to recommendations that urged China to seek abolition of the death penalty and publish execution data, release human rights defenders and lawyers, repeal or amend laws and practices that prevent the rights to freedom of expression and free access to information, end prosecution and persecution based on religion or belief, and cease arbitrary detention of Uyghurs and other Muslim groups in Xinjiang. As outlined above, the Chinese government emphasizes the intersection of human rights and national sovereignty in its interpretation of international human rights law. After the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping, remarked, “People support human rights, but let us not forget about national sovereignty.”

 

China has invoked these principles in numerous discussions within the HRC to counter human rights criticisms. For instance, when the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, criticized China's handling of violent incidents in Xinjiang, the Chinese government rebutted the criticism as “pointing fingers” at sovereign states, reaffirming that the High Commissioner should maintain an objective and impartial stance. At the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, the Chinese government previously asserted that no country has the right to interfere in another nation’s internal affairs under the pretext of human rights and that each state is entitled to determine its own political, economic, and social development path. According to China, this position should be considered as a universal consensus on state sovereignty within the international community.

 

In alignment with its fundamental commitment to state sovereignty, China, under Xi Jinping’s leadership, has demonstrated its ambition to shape global governance, particularly in the realm of international human rights. For example, following Xi Jinping’s introduction of the concept of a “Community of Shared Future” (renlei mingyun gongtongti), China successfully incorporated this term into the 2018 HRC resolution titled Promoting Mutually Beneficial Cooperation in the Field of Human Rights. This resolution focused entirely on the issue of development, and Chinese media praised it as the contribution of a “China Solution” to global human rights governance. Subsequently, in 2021, the HRC adopted another China-sponsored motion resolution titled The Contribution of Development to the Enjoyment of All Human Rights, which included key phrases such as “mutually beneficial cooperation” (huhui hezuo). The inclusion of these phrases reflects China’s growing influence in promoting its “human rights discourse” within the international human rights framework. These developments underscore China’s efforts to redefine a global narrative on human rights, moving away from traditional Western approaches and advocating for a development-centered, state-sovereignty-focused perspective.

 

Moreover, China has increasingly engaged in efforts to influence and modify the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process. Under the UPR mechanism of the HRC, a state's human rights performance is reviewed every four to five years through an interactive dialogue between the state and other UN member states. In the past UPR cycles, China has employed a series of strategies aimed at manipulating the process and mitigating scrutiny. For instance, during the third UPR cycle in 2018, after a series of group negotiations, China received more than a hundred reports from the member states, which indirectly reduced the time available for each state’s representative to offer recommendations or express criticisms.

 

Additionally, China has constantly sought to diminish the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) within the UPR process. China frequently interrupts NGOs’ interventions by raising procedural objections, accusing them of “abusing” their standing at the UN, violating procedural rules, or questioning the credibility of their representatives. According to an NGO representative in Geneva, China tried to block the representatives’ intervention and simply give the NGOs their positive campaign materials. This adversarial approach aligns with the Chinese government’s broader negative stance towards human rights NGOs within mainland China.

 

Conclusion


Given China’s increasing influence on international affairs, its “human rights discourse” has emerged as a significant component of the international human rights framework. In Part One, we examined the evolution of China’s “human rights discourse” and its core elements, which not only reflect China’s distinctive governance model and cultural values but also serve as the foundation for its effort to reshape the international human rights regime. By consistently asserting its influence within UN affairs, particularly through the HRC, China is actively advocating for a development-oriented and sovereignty-centered global human rights framework. Moreover, China’s invocation of the principle of “non-intervention in internal affairs” in response to external criticisms underscores its strategic pursuit of broader autonomy on the global stage.

 

Part Two of this article series will explore China’s second strategy to promote its “Human Rights Discourse” and reshape the international human rights framework through opposition of the U.S.-dominated human rights narrative.


 

Glossary


1989 Tiananmen Square Incident: Known in China as the June Fourth Incident, it was a student-led demonstration held in Tiananmen Square, Beijing, China, lasting from April 15th to June 4, 1989. After weeks of unsuccessful attempts between the demonstrators and the Chinese government to find a peaceful resolution, the Chinese government declared martial law on the night of June 3rd and deployed troops to occupy the square in what is referred to as the Tiananmen Square massacre. The events are sometimes called the '89 Democracy Movement, or the Tiananmen uprising.

Collective human rights: They are divided into two categories, domestic collective human rights and international collective human rights. Domestic collective human rights, also known as the rights of specific groups, mainly refer to the rights of ethnic minorities, children, women, the elderly, persons with disabilities, prisoners, foreign nationals, and refugees. International collective human rights, also known as national human rights, primarily refer to the right to self-determination and the right to development. Additionally, they include the rights to peace and security, environmental rights, the right to freely dispose of natural wealth and resources, and the right to humanitarian assistance, among others.

Community of Shared Future: Community of common destiny for mankind, officially translated as community with a shared future for mankind or human community with a shared future, is a political slogan used by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to describe a stated foreign-policy goal of the People's Republic of China.

Non-governmental organizations: Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are organizations that are usually independent of the government and are typically non-profit. They can be involved in humanitarianism, social sciences, or provide services to their members and others.

The principle of “non-interference in internal affairs”: According to the Chinese government, no external actor should intervene in a country’s domestic matters, especially regarding human rights, as it would infringe on national sovereignty. China uses this principle to resist external criticism and maintain control over its internal legal and political affairs.

"Socialism with Chinese Characteristics": This is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s summary of its current program. Its meaning lies in combining the universal truths of Marxism with the specific realities of China. The program pursues a path that fits China's unique conditions, aiming to modernize industry, agriculture, defense, and technology. It also seeks to build a prosperous, democratic, civilized, harmonious, and modern socialist nation.


 

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